Talking to both sides
| Abstract | The ‘explanatory gap’ (Levine 1983) refers to a gap between physical and phenomenal explanations of consciousness. I wish to show that we can take the gap on board and still go on to develop an explanation or model that is aware of and refers to both sides of this gap, similar to Varela's Neurophenomenology(1996). Also such a model may refer to both sides via the postulation of a descriptive instrumental variable without the need to postulate another ontological category beyond the mind's and brain's identity (Levine 1983). The variable's values will be determined by both first and third person data working in unison. Attributing consciousness to agents is done through an adaptation of Dennett’s Intentional Stance (1981). However, proposing such a model and in my use of first person data to facilitate this, Dennett will be my chief opponent, so his objections to such an approach will receive the most attention. | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesA. H. C. van der Heijden, P. T. W. Hudson & A. G. Kurvink (1997). On Widening the Explanatory Gap. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):157-158.
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Neil Campbell Manson (2002). Consciousness-Dependence and the Explanatory Gap. Inquiry 45 (4):521-540.
E. Diaz-Leon (2009). How Many Explanatory Gaps Are There? APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 8 (2):33-35.
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David J. Chalmers (2007). Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
Joseph Levine (2001). Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker (1999). Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Review 108 (1):1-46.
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