Was I Entitled or Should I Apologize? Affirmative Action Going Forward

The Journal of Ethics 15 (3):253-263 (2011)
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Abstract

As a U.S. civil rights policy, affirmative action commonly denotes race-conscious and result-oriented efforts by private and public officials to correct the unequal distribution of economic opportunity and education attributed to slavery, segregation, poverty and racism. Opponents argue that affirmative action (1) violates ideals of color-blind public policies, offending moral principles of fairness and constitutional principles of equality and due process; (2) has proven to be socially and politically divisive; (3) has not made things better; (4) mainly benefits middle-class, wealthy and foreign-born blacks; (4) stigmatizes its beneficiaries; and (5) compromises the self-esteem and self-respect of beneficiaries who know that they have been awarded preferential treatment. By way of a thought experiment, imagine that after decades of public policy and experimentation, the United States public finally came to agree: affirmative action is morally and legally wrong. Employing such a thought experiment, this essay by a beneficiary of affirmative action—written in response to James Sterba’s Affirmative Action for the Future (2009)—examines duties of moral repair and the possibility that the past beneficiaries of affirmative action owe apologies, compensation or some other highly personal form of corrective accountability. Beneficiaries of affirmative action have experienced woundedness and moral insecurity. Indeed, the practice of affirmative action comes with a psychology, a set of psychological benefits and burdens whose moral logic those of us who believe in our own fallibility—as much as we believe in the justice of what we have received and conferred on others—should address.

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Anita Allen
Dublin City University

Citations of this work

Affirmative action.Robert Fullinwider - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Blinde Flecken der Politischen Philosophie?Franziska Dübgen - 2019 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 67 (4):619-633.
Ist die Praxis bevorzugter Anstellung moralisch zulässig?Christine Bratu - 2020 - Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie 7 (1):301-324.

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The role-model argument and faculty diversity.Anita L. Allen - 1993 - Philosophical Forum 24 (1-3):267-281.

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