Deontic logic and the possibility of moral conflict

Erkenntnis 33 (1):57 - 71 (1990)
Standard dyadic deontic logic (as well as standard deontic logic) has recently come under attack by moral philosophers who maintain that the axioms of standard dyadic deontic logic are biased against moral theories which generate moral conflicts. Since moral theories which generate conflicts are at least logically tenable, it is argued, standard dyadic deontic logic should be modified so that the set of logically possible moral theories includes those which generate such conflicts. I argue that (1) there are only certain types of moral conflicts which are interesting, and which have worried moral theorists, (2) the modification of standard dyadic deontic logic along the lines suggested by those who defend the possibility of moral conflicts makes possible only uninteresting types of moral conflicts, and (3) the general strategy of piecemeal modification standard dyadic deontic logic is misguided: the possibility of interesting moral conflicts cannot be achieved in that way.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00634551
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Krister Segerberg (1971). An Essay in Classical Modal Logic. Uppsala,Filosofiska Föreningen Och Filosofiska Institutionen Vid Uppsala Universitet.

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