Deontological Restrictions and the Good/Bad Asymmetry

Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (4):464-481 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue that a defense of deontological restrictions need not resort to what I call the 'Good/Bad asymmetry', according to which it is morally more important to avoid harming others than to prevent just such harm. I replace this paradoxical asymmetry with two non-paradoxical ones. These are the following: We ought to treat an act of preventing harm to persons precisely as such , rather than as the causing of a benefit; but we ought to treat an act that causes harm precisely as such , rather than as the prevention of a benefit. It is morally more important not to cause harm than to cause benefit. I show how we can use those asymmetries, together with certain other assumptions, to defend restrictions. I also offer a partial defense of the first of the two asymmetries

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Knobe vs Machery: Testing the trade-off hypothesis.Ron Mallon - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (2):247-255.
Intentional action and the praise-blame asymmetry.Frank Hindriks - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):630-641.
On Having a Good.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2014 - Philosophy 89 (3):405-429.
Good for and good about.Jenny Teichman - 2003 - Philosophy 78 (1):115-121.
Unintentionally biasing the data: Reply to Knobe.Roblin R. Meeks - 2004 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):220-223.
Forced supererogation and deontological restrictions.Bashshar Haydar - 2002 - Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4):445-454.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-09-14

Downloads
44 (#316,161)

6 months
1 (#1,027,696)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David Alm
Lund University

References found in this work

Harming some to save others.Frances Kamm - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 57 (3):227 - 260.

Add more references