Equality and Comparative Justice

Inquiry 53 (4):309-325 (2011)
In this paper I criticize the standard argument for deontological egalitarianism, understood as the thesis that there is a moral claim to have an equal share of well-being or whatever other good counts. That argument is based on the idea that equals should be treated equally. I connect the debate over egalitarianism with that over comparative justice. A common theme is a general skepticism against comparative claims. I argue (i) that there can be no claim to equality based simply on the fact of equal worth as that fact itself does not have any value for the supposed claim holder; and (ii) intuitions that suggest otherwise can be explained away without appealing to comparative claims
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DOI 10.1080/0020174X.2010.493366
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References found in this work BETA
Larry S. Temkin (1986). Inequality. Philosophy and Public Affairs 15 (2):99-121.
T. M. Scanlon (1975). Preference and Urgency. Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):655-669.

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David Alm (2011). Promises, Rights and Claims. Law and Philosophy 30 (1):51-76.

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