Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 22 (2):93-119 (2003)
|Abstract||Perhaps the greatest impediment to a viable libertarianism is the provision of a satisfactory explanation of how actions that are undetermined by an agent''s character can still be under the control of, or up to, the agent. The luck problem has been most assiduously examined by Robert Kane who supplies a detailed account of how this problem can be resolved. Although Kane''s theory is innovative, insightful, and more resourceful than most of his critics believe, it ultimately cannot account for the type of control that moral responsibility and (ultimate) agency legitimately require.|
|Keywords||Agency Free Will Libertarianism Luck Metaphysics Moral Responsibility Kane, R|
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