Scientific progress and Peircean utopian realism
Erkenntnis 20 (3):253 - 280 (1983)
| Abstract | I argue that (1) if scientific progress, construed in revolutionary terms, were to continue indefinitely long, then any non-trivial question answerable by the use of the scientific method would in fact be answered in a way that would allow for further refinement without undermining the essential correctness of the answer; and (2) it is reasonable to believe that scientific progress will continue indefinitely long. The establishment of (1) and (2) entails that any non-trivial empirically answerable question will be answered in a way that allows for further indefinite refinement.Moreover, inasmuch as the establishment of (1) and (2) undermines the ontological relativity inherent in the commonly held view that unto eternity there will be competing alternative scientific theories of differing ontological commitment, it provides for the ontologically and epistemologically privileged position of science. | |||||||||
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