Sceptical theism and evidential arguments from evil

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):496 – 516 (2003)
Abstract
Sceptical theists--e.g., William Alston and Michael Bergmann--have claimed that considerations concerning human cognitive limitations are alone sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil. We argue that, if the considerations deployed by sceptical theists are sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil, then those considerations are also sufficient to undermine inferences that play a crucial role in ordinary moral reasoning. If cogent, our argument suffices to discredit sceptical theist responses to evidential arguments from evil
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Citations of this work BETA
Scott Sehon (2010). The Problem of Evil: Skeptical Theism Leads to Moral Paralysis. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (2):67 - 80.
Justin P. McBrayer (2010). Skeptical Theism. Philosophy Compass 5 (7):611-623.
John Bishop & Ken Perszyk (2011). The Normatively Relativised Logical Argument From Evil. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (2):109-126.

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