Two Kinds of Time-Consciousness and Three Kinds of Content
Axiomathes 23 (1):61-80 (2013)
| Abstract | This paper explores the distinction between perceiving an object as extended in time, and experiencing a sequence of perceptions. I argue that this distinction cannot be adequately described by any present theory of time-consciousness and that in order to solve the puzzle, we need to consider perceptual content as having three distinct constituents: Explicit content, which has a particular phenomenal character, modal content, or the kind of content that is contributed by the psychological mode, and implicit content, which lacks phenomenal character. These notions are then further clarified and related to each other | |||||||||
| Keywords | Time Content Perception Time-consciousness | |||||||||
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