Two Kinds of Time-Consciousness and Three Kinds of Content

Axiomathes 23 (1):61-80 (2013)
Abstract
This paper explores the distinction between perceiving an object as extended in time, and experiencing a sequence of perceptions. I argue that this distinction cannot be adequately described by any present theory of time-consciousness and that in order to solve the puzzle, we need to consider perceptual content as having three distinct constituents: Explicit content, which has a particular phenomenal character, modal content, or the kind of content that is contributed by the psychological mode, and implicit content, which lacks phenomenal character. These notions are then further clarified and related to each other
Keywords Time  Content  Perception  Time-consciousness
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References found in this work BETA
Tim Crane (2003). The Intentional Structure of Consciousness. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. 33-56.
Jason Ford (2008). Attention and the New Sceptics. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (3):59-86.

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Similar books and articles
Colin McGinn (1988). Consciousness and Content. Proceedings of the British Academy 74:219-39.
Richard Brown (2012). The Brain and its States. In Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. John Benjamins. 88--211.
Mohan Matthen (forthcoming). Image Content. In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford University Press.
Sara Worley (1997). Belief and Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):41-55.
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