Time, Mode and Perceptual Content

Acta Analytica 27 (4):425-439 (2012)
Abstract
Francois Recanati has recently argued that each perceptual state has two distinct kinds of content, complete and explicit content. According to Recanati, the former is a function of the latter and the psychological mode of perception. Furthermore, he has argued that explicit content is temporally neutral and that time-consciousness is a feature of psychological mode. In this paper it is argued, pace Recanati, that explicit content is not temporally neutral. Recanati’s position is initially presented. Three desiderata for a theory of time-consciousness are subsequently introduced. It is then argued that a theory locating time-consciousness as a feature of psychological mode will fail to satisfy these desiderata. In the last section the intentionality of memories is discussed. Using the notion of shiftable indexical, it is argued that memories have the same explicit content as perceptions, but that they nevertheless can have different conditions of satisfaction since they are entertained in different modes
Keywords Time  Content  Perception  Memory  Psychological mode  Recanati
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References found in this work BETA
Alexius Meinong (1899). Über Gegenstände Höherer Ordnung Und Deren Verhältnisse Zur Inneren Wahrnehmung. Zeitschrift für Psychologie Und Physiologie Der Sinnesorgane 21:182--272.

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