Graduate studies at Western
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (2):197–225 (2003)
|Abstract||It has been common in contemporary philosophical logic to separate existence, essence and logic. I would like to reverse these separative tendencies. Doing so yields two theses, one about the existential basis of truth, the other about the essentialist basis of logic. The first thesis counters the common claim that both logical and essential truths-in short, structural truths-are existence-free. It is proposed that only real existences can generate essentialist and logical predications. The second thesis counters the common assumption that logic is free of essentialist involvement. I propose the contrary-logical predications are to be explained as a special kind of essentialist attributions|
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