Alternative questions and knowledge attributions
Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):1-27 (2010)
| Abstract | We discuss the 'problem of convergent knowledge', an argument presented by J. Schaffer in favour of contextualism about knowledge attributions, and against the idea that knowledge- wh can be simply reduced to knowledge of the proposition answering the question. Schaffer's argument centrally involves alternative questions of the form 'whether A or B'. We propose an analysis of these on which the problem of convergent knowledge does not arise. While alternative questions can contextually restrict the possibilities relevant for knowledge attributions, what Schaffer's puzzle reveals is a pragmatic ambiguity in what 'knowing the answer' means: in his problematic cases, the subject knows only a partial answer to the question. This partial knowledge can be counted as adequate only on externalist grounds. | |||||||||
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Anthony Brueckner (1994). The Shifting Content of Knowledge Attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (1):123-126.
Jason Rourke (2013). A Counterexample to the Contrastive Account of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):637-643.
Jonathan Schaffer (2007). Knowing the Answer. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):383-403.
Jonathan Schaffer (2007). Knowing the Answer. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):383–403.
Nikola Kompa (2005). The Semantics of Knowledge Attributions. Acta Analytica 20 (1):16-28.
Jesper Kallestrup (2009). Knowledge-Wh and the Problem of Convergent Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):468-476.
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