Visual space is not cognitively impenetrable
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):366-367 (1999)
| Abstract | Cognitive impenetrability (CI) of a large part of visual perception is taken for granted by those of us in the field of computational vision who attempt to recover descriptions of space using geometry and statistics as tools. These tools clearly point out, however, that CI cannot extend to the level of structured descriptions of object surfaces, as Pylyshyn suggests. The reason is that visual space – the description of the world inside our heads – is a nonEuclidean curved space. As a consequence, the only alternative for a vision system is to develop several descriptions of space–time; these are representations of reduced intricacy and capture partial aspects of objective reality. As such, they make sense in the context of a class of tasks/actions/plans/purposes, and thus cannot be cognitively impenetrable. | |||||||||
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John Schwenkler (2012). Does Visual Spatial Awareness Require the Visual Awareness of Space? Mind and Language 27 (3):308-329.
Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1999). Is Vision Continuous with Cognition? The Case for Cognitive Impenetrability of Visual Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):341-365.
L. M. Vaina (1990). What and Where in the Human Visual System: Two Hierarchies of Visual Modules. Synthese 83 (1):49-91.
Robert French (1987). The Geometry of Visual Space. Noûs 21 (June):115-133.
Cyril Latimer (1999). Binary Oppositions and What Focuses in Focal Attention. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):383-384.
Edouard Gentaz & Yves Rossetti (1999). Is Haptic Perception Continuous with Cognition? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):378-379.
Louise Richardson (2010). Seeing Empty Space. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):227-243.
Alexander Grunewald (1999). Neurophysiology Indicates Cognitive Penetration of the Visual System. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):379-380.
Boris Crassini, Jack Broerse, R. H. Day, Christopher J. Best & W. A. Sparrow (1999). What is the Point of Attempting to Make a Case for Cognitive Impenetrability of Visual Perception? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):372-373.
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