Online research in philosophy

The existence and diversity of human cultures are made possible by our species-specific cognitive capacities. But how? Do cultures emerge and diverge as a result of the deployment, over generations and in different populations, of general abilities to learn, imitate and communicate? What role if any do domain-specific evolved cognitive abilities play in the emergence and evolution of cultures? These questions have been approached from different vantage points in different disciplines. Here we present a view that is currently developing out of the converging work of developmental psychologists, evolutionary psychologists and cognitive anthropologists.

A look at Mach's work on monocular stereoscopy with relation to Mach Bands and the sensation of space.

It is often assumed that empiricism in the philosophy of mathematics was laid to rest by Frege’s stinging attack on Mill. I will argue that empiricism is alive and well and able to deal with almost everything that’s thrown at it. In particular, I will show how the brand of empiricism I subscribe to is able to give a satisfying account of mathematical knowledge. This brand of mathematical empiricism has a rather curious feature though: some parts of mathematics (e.g., analysis, modern algebra, ZFC set theory) are taken to be theories about which we have genuine mathematical knowledge, while others (e.g., set theory with large cardinal axioms) are (following Quine) treated as “mathematical recreation”. I will defend this demarcation against some recent criticisms from Mary Leng.

In this paper I discuss the role played by Ernst Mach on Nietzsche’s thought. Starting from the contents of his Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen, I’ll show the close similarities between their view on both human knowledge and the scientific world description. In his writing on science Nietzsche shares Mach’s critique to the 19th century mechanism and its metaphysical ground, as much as his way of defining the substantial notions such as matter, ego and free will. Moreover, my investigation will make it clear that Mach cannot be seen as a direct source of Nietzsche’s thought, since the latter wrote many times on the same subjects long before his first reading one of his works. Rather, it is possible to consider the writings of Lange, Spir and Spencer as the first sources of Nietzsche’s views on the main themes Mach dealt with in his work from 1886.

The mind as a whole escapes objective studies because belief in mind- independent reality is self-contradictory and by definition excludes subjective experience (awareness, 'consciousness') from reality. The mind's center therefore vanishes in studies which imply exclusive objectivism or empiricism. This conceptual difficulty can be counteracted by acknowledging that all mental and world structures arise within an unstructured origin- and-matrix for knowledge-structures and beliefs. The mind's structure is thus at the center of reality. Use of such a zero-structure reference can also help to clarify some related conceptual difficulties and to bridge the gap between the 'two cultures'.

I examine some aspects of Mach’s concern for photographs and phonographs. I start with the phonographs, and I examine in particular Mach’s reference to this device in his account of the development of written language. My second point is a comparison between Mach's reference to phonographs and hieroglyphs and some very similar insights in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Lastly, I address some aspects of Mach’s interest in photographical techniques, and I try to draw a parallel between Mach’s conception of mental economical pictures and the method of composite portraiture developed by Galton.

This comparative study argues that both Aristotle and the Ch'eng-Chu School deny that a weak-willed person truly and clearly knows what is best at the time of action, but their analyses of a weak-willed person's knowledge are rather different. It is shown that both Aristotle and the Ch'eng-Chu School believe that practical knowledge presupposes repeatedly acting on it and thus that the defect of the weak-willed person's knowledge cannot be overcome by purely cognitive training.