David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50:73-97 (1990)
The title refers to theories that require a certain sort of relation between X and an experience of S in order that S perceive X. The relation might be causal, counterfactual, doxastic, or otherwise. It is argued against such theories that there are possible cases in which X stands in the required relation to an experience of S and S does not perceive X and cases in which X is perceived though it does not stand in the required relation
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Citations of this work BETA
William P. Alston (2005). Perception and Representation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):253-289.
Kenneth Hobson (2013). In Defense of Relational Direct Realism. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):550-574.
Pierre Le Morvan (2008). Sensory Experience and Intentionalism. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):685-702.
Nathaniel F. Barrett & Wesley J. Wildman (2009). Seeing is Believing? How Reinterpreting Perception as Dynamic Engagement Alters the Justificatory Force of Religious Experience. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 66 (2):71 - 86.
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