Internalism and externalism in epistemology

Philosophical Topics 14 (1):179-221 (1986)
Internalism restricts justifiers to what is "within" the subject. two main forms of internalism are (1) perspectival internalism (pi), which restricts justifiers to what the subject knows or justifiably believes, and (2) access internalism (ai), which restricts justifiers to what is directly accessible to the subject. the two forms are analyzed and interrelated, and the grounds for each are examined. it is concluded that although pi is both unacceptable and without adequate support, a modest form of ai might be defended
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Ram Neta & Duncan Pritchard (2007). McDowell and the New Evil Genius. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):381–396.

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