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  • Alia Al-Saji (2007). The Temporality of Life: Merleau-Ponty, Bergson, and the Immemorial Past. Southern Journal of Philosophy:177-206.
    Borrowing conceptual tools from Bergson, this essay asks after the shift in the temporality of life from Merleau-Ponty’s Phénoménologie de la perception to his later works. Although the Phénoménologie conceives life in terms of the field of presence of bodily action, later texts point to a life of invisible and immemorial dimensionality. By reconsidering Bergson, but also thereby revising his reading of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty develops a non-serial theory of time in the later works, one that acknowledges the verticality and irreducibility of the past. Life in the flesh relies on unconsciousness or forgetting, on an invisibility that structures its passage.
    Phenomenology in Continental Philosophy
    Maurice Merleau-Ponty in 20th Century Philosophy
    Philosophy of Time, Misc in Metaphysics
    Henri Bergson in 20th Century Philosophy
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  • 216.9Alia Al-Saji (2008). "A Past Which has Never Been Present": Bergsonian Dimensions in Merleau-Ponty's Theory of the Prepersonal. Research in Phenomenology 38 (1):41-71.
    Merleau-Ponty's reference to "a past which has never been present" at the end of "Le sentir" challenges the typical framework of the Phenomenology of Perception, with its primacy of perception and bodily field of presence. In light of this "original past," I propose a re-reading of the prepersonal as ground of perception that precedes the dichotomies of subject-object and activity-passivity. Merleau-Ponty searches in the Phenomenology for language to describe this ground, borrowing from multiple registers (notably Bergson, but also Husserl). This (...) "sensory life" is a coexistence of sensing and sensible—bodily and worldly—rhythms. Perception is, then, not a natural given, but a temporal process of synchronization between rhythms. By drawing on Bergson, this can be described as a process in which virtual life is actualized into perceiving subject and object perceived. Significantly, this process involves non-coincidence or delay whereby sensory life is always already past for perception. (shrink)
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  • 206.9Alia Al-Saji (2009). An Absence That Counts in the World: Merleau-Ponty's Later Philosophy of Time in Light of Bernet's ‘Einleitung’. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 40 (2):207-227.
    This paper examines Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy of time in light of his critique and reconceptualization of Edmund Husserl’s early time-analyses. Drawing on The Visible and the Invisible and lecture courses, I elaborate Merleau-Ponty’s re-reading of Husserl’s time-analyses through the lens of Rudolf Bernet’s “Einleitung” to this work. My question is twofold: what becomes of the central Husserlian concepts of present and retention in Merleau-Ponty’s later work, and how do Husserl’s elisions, especially of the problem of forgetting, become generative moments (...) for Merleau-Ponty’s thought on time? The answer passes through the logic of institution as the “retrograde movement of the true” (Henri Bergson) and through unconsciousness as disarticulation of the perceptual field, as Merleau-Ponty attempts to detach Husserlian concepts from the philosophy of consciousness and rehabilitate them within an ontology of time. (shrink)
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  • 162.7Renauld Barabaras (2009). The Turning of Experience : Merleau-Ponty and Bergson. In Robert Vallier, Wayne Jeffrey Froman & Bernard Flynn (eds.), Merleau-Ponty and the Possibilities of Philosophy: Transforming the Tradition. State University of New York Press.
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  • 159.2Alia Al-Saji (2009). A Phenomenology of Critical-Ethical Vision: Merleau-Ponty, Bergson, and the Question of Seeing Differently. Chiasmi International: Publication trilingue autour de la pensée de Merleau-Ponty 11:375-398.
    Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s “Eye and Mind” and Bergson’s Matière et mémoire and “La perception du changement,” I ask what resources are available in vision for interrupting objectifying habits of seeing. While both Bergson and Merleau-Ponty locate the possibility of seeing differently in the figure of the painter, I develop by means of their texts, and in dialogue with Iris Marion Young’s work, a more general phenomenology of hesitation that grounds what I am calling “critical-ethical vision.” Hesitation, I argue, stems from (...) affect and leads to critical memory. In hesitation, the seeming coincidence between my habits of seeing and the visible is decentered, revealing these habits and their social reference as the constitutive horizon of my field of vision. Hesitation, then, provides the phenomenological moment within which vision may become at once critically watchful, destabilizing its objectifying habits, and ethically responsive, recollecting its affective grounds. The critical and the ethical are here inseparable. Critically, this vision is an awareness of the structures of invisibility, diacritical and habitual, social and historical, to which my vision owes—dimensions which institute particular ways of seeing and being as norm while eliding others. Ethically, this is the recognition of how seeing is already seeing with others—others whose affective influence is operative within vision, even as their existence is reductively represented or denied. (shrink)
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  • 151.5Alia Al-Saji (2001). Merleau-Ponty and Bergson: Bodies of Expression and Temporalities in the Flesh. Philosophy Today 45 (5):110-123.
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  • 150.4Elizabeth Grosz (1999). Merleau-Ponty and Irigaray in the Flesh. In Dorothea Olkowski & James Morley (eds.), Merleau-ponty, interiority and exteriority, psychic life and the world. State University of New York Press.
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  • 149.5Robert Vallier (2009). Elemental Difference : Of Life, Flesh, and Earth in Merleau-Ponty and the Timaeus. In Robert Vallier, Wayne Jeffrey Froman & Bernard Flynn (eds.), Merleau-Ponty and the Possibilities of Philosophy: Transforming the Tradition. State University of New York Press.
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  • 148.6Glen Mazis (1992). Merleau-Ponty and the Backward Flow of Time: The Reversibility of Temporality and the Temporality of Reversibility. In Shaun Gallagher Thomas Busch (ed.), Merleau-Ponty, Hermeneutics and Postmodernism.
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  • 145.1Stuart F. Spicker (1973). Inner Time and Lived-Through Time: Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 4 (October):235-247.
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  • 144.7Dan Zahavi, Merleau-Ponty on Husserl. A Reappraisal.
    If one comes to Phénoménologie de la perception after having read Sein und Zeit (or Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs) one will be in for a surprise. Both works contain a number of both implicit and explicit references to Husserl, but the presentation they give is so utterly different, that one might occasionally wonder whether they are referring to the same author. Thus nobody can overlook that Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of Husserl differs significantly from Heidegger’s. It is far more charitable. In (...) fact, when evaluating the merits of respectively Husserl and Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty often goes very much against the standard view. This is not only the case in his notorious remark on the very first page of Phénoménologie de la Perception where he declares that the whole of Sein und Zeit is nothing but an explication of Husserl’s notion of Lifeworld, but also - to give just one further example - in one of his Sorbonne-lectures, where Merleau-Ponty writes that Husserl took the issue of historicity far more seriously than Heidegger. (shrink)
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