Graduate studies at Western
American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (July):223-41 (1971)
|Abstract||This paper distinguishes and interrelates a number of respects in which persons have been thought to be in a specially favorable epistemic position vis-A-Vis their own mental states. The most important distinction is a six-Fold one between infallibility, Omniscience, Indubitability, Incorrigibility, Truth-Sufficiency, And self-Warrant. Each of these varieties can then be sub-Divided as the kind of modality, If any, Involved. It is also argued that discussions of self-Knowledge have been hampered by a failure to recognize these distinctions|
|Keywords||Corrigibility Disposition Epistemology Knowledge Metaphysics Mind Sensation Armstrong, D Aune, B|
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