What's wrong with immediate knowledge?

Synthese 55 (April):73-96 (1983)
Abstract
Immediate knowledge is here construed as true belief that does not owe its status as knowledge to support by other knowledge (or justified belief) of the same subject. The bulk of the paper is devoted to a criticism of attempts to show the impossibility of immediate knowledge. I concentrate on attempts by Wilfrid Sellars and Laurence Bonjour to show that putative immediate knowledge really depends on higher-level knowledge or justified belief about the status of the beliefs involved in the putative immediate knowledge. It is concluded that their arguments are lacking in cogency.
Keywords Epistemology  Immediacy  Justification  Bonjour, L  Sellars, W
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DOI 10.1007/BF00485374
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References found in this work BETA
Roderick M. Chisholm (1966). Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.
D. M. Armstrong (1973). Belief, Truth and Knowledge. London,Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
William P. Alston (2002). Sellars and the "Myth of the Given". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):69-86.

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