A limited defense of the knowledge argument

Philosophical Studies 90 (1):35-56 (1998)
Mary learns all the physical facts that one can learn by watching lectures on black-on-white television. According to Jackson, Mary learns new facts when she leaves the room and has color experiences, and that this undermines physicalism. Physicalists have responded by denying the new facts thesis; they argue, she acquires abilities, acquaintance knowledge, or new guises. I argue that the NFT is more plausible than any of the proposed alternatives. I also argue that the NFT does not undermine physicalism unless physicalism entails that all physical facts are discursively learnable, and that the latter entailment is questionable.
Keywords Argument  Epistemology  Experience  Knowledge  Jackson, F
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DOI 10.1023/A:1004290020847
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