Ratio 17 (3):241-255 (2004)
|Abstract||Derek Parfit's combined-spectrum argument seems to conflict with epistemicism, a viable theory of vagueness. While Parfit argues for the indeterminacy of personhood, epistemicism denies indeterminacy. But, we argue, the linguistically based determinacy that epistemicism supports lacks the sort of normative or ontological significance that concerns Parfit. Thus, we reformulate his argument to make it consistent with epistemicism. We also dispute Roy Sorensen's suggestion that Parfit's argument relies on an assumption that fuels resistance to epistemicism, namely, that 'the magnitude of a modification must be proportional to its effect.'|
|Keywords||Epistemicism Indeterminacy Metaphysics Vagueness Parfit, D|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
J. Burgess (2001). Vagueness, Epistemicism and Response-Dependence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):507 – 524.
Dan López de Sa (2006). Is 'Everything' Precise? Dialectica 60 (4):397–409.
Mario G.’Omez-Torrente (2002). Vagueness and Margin for Error Principles. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):107-125.
Mario Gómez-Torrente (2002). Vagueness and Margin for Error Principles. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):107-125.
Roy A. Sorensen (2000). A Vague Demonstration. Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (5):507-522.
John MacFarlane (2010). Fuzzy Epistemicism. In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press.
David Enoch (2007). Epistemicism and Nihilism About Vagueness: What's the Difference? Philosophical Studies 133 (2):285 - 311.
Stuart Rachels Torin Alter (2004). Epistemicism and the Combined Spectrum. Ratio (3):241-255.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads30 ( #40,824 of 549,062 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,703 of 549,062 )
How can I increase my downloads?