Epistemic Entitlement

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2011)
Abstract In the early 1990s there emerged a growing interest with the concept of epistemic entitlement. Philosophers who acknowledge the existence of entitlements maintain that there are beliefs or judgments unsupported by evidence available to the subject, but which the subject nonetheless is justified in believing, that is, has the epistemic right to hold. Some of these may include beliefs non-inferentially sourced in perception, memory, introspection, testimony, and the a priori. Unlike the traditional notion of justification, entitlement is often characterized as an externalist type of epistemic warrant, in the sense that a subject’s being entitled is determined by facts and circumstances that are independent of any reasoning capacities she may or may not have, and which the subject herself need not understand or be able to recognize. One key motivation for this view is that the inclusion of entitlement in epistemology can account for the commonly held intuition that largely unreflective individuals, such as children and non-human animals, possess warrant and basic knowledge about the world. It also paves the way for a tenable foundationalist epistemology, according to which there exist warranted beliefs which are not themselves warranted or justified by any further beliefs. This article explores theories of entitlement as presented by four prominent philosophers: Fred Dretske, Tyler Burge, Crispin Wright, and Christopher Peacocke.
Keywords Dretske  Burge  Wright  Peacocke
Categories
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 5,711
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure

    Similar books and articles
    Albert Casullo (2007). What Is Entitlement? Acta Analytica 22 (4):267-279.
    Chris Tucker (2009). Perceptual Justification and Warrant by Default. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87: 445-63 87 (3):445-63.
    Crispin Wright & Martin Davies (2004). On Epistemic Entitlement. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78:167 - 245.
    Tyler Burge (2003). Perceptual Entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-548.
    Tyler Burge (2003). Perceptual Entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-48.
    Huiming Ren (2009). Entitlement to Self-Knowledge and Brute Error. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (4):543 – 562.

    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2011-04-25

    Total downloads

    135 ( #3,254 of 551,055 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    8 ( #8,982 of 551,055 )

    How can I increase my downloads?


    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.

    Other forums