Theoria 67 (3):229-39 (2001)
|Abstract||David Lewis (1983, 1988) and Laurence Nemirow (1980, 1990) claim that knowing what an experience is like is knowing-how, not knowing-that. They identify this know-how with the abilities to remember, imagine, and recognize experiences, and Lewis labels their view ‘the Ability Hypothesis’. The Ability Hypothesis has intrinsic interest. But Lewis and Nemirow devised it specifically to block certain anti-physicalist arguments due to Thomas Nagel (1974, 1986) and Frank Jackson (1982, 1986). Does it?|
|Keywords||Ability Experience Hypothesis Knowing How Metaphysics Physicalism Chomsky, N Lewis, D Nemirow, L|
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