Online research in philosophy

In this paper, I propose that influential arguments of Jacques Derridas's and Judith Butler's rely on behaviorism and relativism, a reliance which has implications for, among other things, the issue of hate speech. I begin with a brief discussion of the philosophy of W. V. O. Quine, a thinker seldom discussed in relationship to continental poststructuralism. Quine is interesting because he explicitly defends an ontological relativism combined with linguistic behaviorism, the latter as influenced by B. F. Skinner and John Watson. I then show that Butler's and Derrida's theories demonstrate a similar yet unacknowledged lineage. I devote the final section of the paper to a discussion of hate speech, and the problematization of behaviorism and relativism it entails. Key Words: behaviorism • Judith Butler • Jacques Derrida • hate speech • poststructuralism • W. V. O. Quine.

Machine generated contents note: 1. Thinking in black and white; 2. Repairing the slave reparations debate; 3. Advancing the slave reparations debate; 4. One cheer for affirmative action; 5. Two cheers for affirmative action; 6. Why I used to hate hate speech restrictions; 7. Why I still hate hate speech restrictions; 8. How to stop worrying and learn to love hate crime laws; 9. How to keep on loving hate crime laws; 10. Is racial profiling irrational?; 11. Is racial profiling immoral?.

As the composition of university campuses becomes more diverse, campus journalists must become better at making decisions that avoid needlessly offending members of various ethnic and cultural groups. This examination explores the role of the campus media and includes incidents that illustrate campus journalists' problems with decision making when confronted with material regarding their diverse audiences. It explores the political correctness movement on campuses, notes the advantage of ethical reasoning, offers a philosophical foundation for decision making based on respect, and proposes a Model of Respect. This model should enable novice journalists to better self-regulate content, precluding the need for campus administrators and judicial bodies to establish regulations and laws that "force" sensitivity into campus speech and newspapers.

As a liberal society, we are deeply committed to a principle of free speech. In fact, this commitment is so entrenched that it often seems to trump other very important liberal values, such as equality. Critical race theorists, among others, have argued that (some) racist hate speech ought to be regulated because it harms racial minorities in ways that are incompatible with racial equality, and so, in ways that a liberal society ought to prevent. A standard liberal response to these arguments accepts the connection between racist hate speech and harm, but claims that such harm is just the price we pay for our commitment to free speech.

Making sense of MacKinnon’s claim that pornography silences women requires attention to the discursive and interpretive frameworks that pornography establishes and promotes. Treating pornography as a form of hate speech is promising, but also limited. A close examination of a legal case, in which pornographic images were used to sexually harass, focuses on the hate speech analogy while illustrating the broad and lasting impact of such depictions when targeted at an individual. Applying the distinction between Absolutist and Reclaimer approaches to hate speech and derogatory terms, the article concludes with a discussion of the possibility of creative development of discursive practices within a context that undermines the semantic authority of members of certain groups.

Hate speech employs discriminatory epithets to insult and stigmatize others on the basis of their race, gender, sexual orientation, or other forms of group membership. The regulation of hate speech is deservedly controversial, in part because debates over hate speech seem to have teased apart libertarian and egalitarian strands within the liberal tradition. In the civil rights movements of the 1960s, libertarian concerns with freedom of movement and association and equal opportunity pointed in the same direction as egalitarian concerns with eradicating racial discrimination and the social and economic inequalities that this discrimination maintained. But debates over hate speech regulation seem to force one to give priority to equality or to liberty. On the one hand, egalitarian concerns may seem to require restricting freedom of expression. Hate speech is an expression of discriminatory attitudes that have a long, ugly, and sometimes violent history. As such, hate speech is deeply offensive to its victims and socially divisive. Though one might well be reluctant to restrict speech, it might seem that the correct response to hate speech, as with other forms of discrimination, is regulation. On the other hand, libertarian concerns may seem to constrain the pursuit of equality. Though one may abhor hate speech and its effects, the cure might seem at least as bad as the disease. Freedoms of expression are among our most fundamental liberties. Offensive ideas are part of the price one must pay to protect these constitutional rights. This being so, it might seem that the correct response to hate speech is more speech—presumably egalitarian speech condemning hate speech—not the restriction of speech.

I take it that liberal justice recognises special protections against the restriction of speech and expression; this is what I call the Free Speech Principle. I ask if this Principle includes speech acts which might broadly be termed ‘hate speech’, where ‘includes’ is sensitive to the distinction between coverage and protection , and between speech that is regulable and speech that should be regulated . I suggest that ‘hate speech’ is too broad a designation to be usefully analysed as a single category, since it includes many different kinds of speech acts, each of which involves very different kinds of free speech interests, and may cause very different kinds of harm. I therefore propose to disaggregate hate speech into various categories which are analysed in turn. I distinguish four main categories of hate speech, namely (1) targeted vilification, (2) diffuse vilification, (3) organised political advocacy for exclusionary and/or eliminationist policies, and (4) other assertions of fact or value which constitute an adverse judgment on an identifiable racial or religious group. Reviewing these categories in the light of the justifications for the Free Speech Principle, I will argue that category (1) is uncovered by the Principle, categories (2) and (3) are covered but unprotected , and that category (4) is protected speech.

At the center of the hate speech controversy is the question whether it constitutes conduct. If hate speech is not conduct, then restricting it runs counter to free speech. But even if it could be shown that it is a kind of conduct, complicated questions arise. Does it necessarily follow that we restrict speech? Practically speaking, can speech even be restricted, either through new legislation or the enforcement of existing laws regulating conduct? Are measures such as hate crimes legislation both useful and appropriate in protecting individuals and groups from violence? The present paper aims to address these questions by reconstructing and assessing Judith Butler’s important treatment of speech-acts and hate speech in her book Excitable Speech: The Politics of the Performative.

In a narrow sense, hate speech is symbolic representation that expresses, hatred, contempt, or disregard for another person or group of persons. The use of deeply insulting racial or ethnic epithets is an example of such hate speech. In a broader sense, hate speech also includes the symbolic representation of views are deeply offensive to others. The expression of the view that women are morally inferior to (or less intelligent than) men is example of hate speech in the broader sense. The question I shall address is this: What should be done about hate speech in the broad sense in a free and open society?