Nagel on imagination and physicalism

Abstract
In "What is it Like to be a Bat?" Thomas Nagel argues that we cannot imagine what it is like to be a bat or presently understand how physicalism might be true. Both arguments have been seriously misunderstood. I defend them against various objections, point out a problem with the argument against physicalism, and show how the problem can be solved
Keywords Epistemology  Imagination  Physicalism  Nagel, T
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