Graduate studies at Western
Journal of Philosophical Research 27:143-58 (2002)
|Abstract||In "What is it Like to be a Bat?" Thomas Nagel argues that we cannot imagine what it is like to be a bat or presently understand how physicalism might be true. Both arguments have been seriously misunderstood. I defend them against various objections, point out a problem with the argument against physicalism, and show how the problem can be solved|
|Keywords||Epistemology Imagination Physicalism Nagel, T|
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