El Argumento de Teoria de Modelos de Putnam y la Metodologia para la Comprension de las Nociones Intencionales

Theoria 17 (3):541-561 (2002)
Putnam's Model- Theoretic Argument has been generally held as invalid. In this work, attention is addressed to two broad facts understated by critics and commentators: (i) there are, at least, two different model-theoretic arguments. One is directed against realism and the other is directed to naturalistic semantics. The general rejection affects the former, but it is open to discussion if it affects the latter; (ii) on the other hand, the model-theoretic argument construed as a reductio argument has not - prima facia - ontological consequences, but only restrains our methodology to deal with the intentional realm
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DOI theoria200217333
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Jürgen Dümont (1999). Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument(S). A Detailed Reconstruction. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 30 (2):341-364.
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