David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
International Philosophical Quarterly 48 (4):493-516 (2008)
Dummett’s Manifestation Argument against realism attempts to show that a realist conception of meaning cannot explain the understanding of truth-conditions transcendent to evidence. In this work the general structure of the argument is discussed along with several objections to it. This examination finds that the anti-realist is committed to a deflationary conception of the normative character of meaning that is unpalatable. This essay contends that the argument in its present form cannot have the metaphysical consequences it claims (at least not without begging the question)
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Darragh Byrne (2005). Compositionality and the Manifestation Challenge. Synthese 144 (1):101--136.
Sanford Shieh (1998). On the Conceptual Foundations of Anti-Realism. Synthese 115 (1):33-70.
Peter Carruthers (1985). Ruling-Out Realism. Philosophia 15 (1-2):61-78.
Bernhard Weiss (2007). Truth and the Enigma of Knowability. Dialectica 61 (4):521–537.
Dorit Bar-On (1996). Anti-Realism and Speaker Knowledge. Synthese 106 (2):139 - 166.
Richard Heck (2002). Meaning and Truth-Conditions: A Reply to Kemp. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):82–87.
Jon Cogburn (2005). The Logic of Logical Revision Formalizing Dummett's Argument. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):15 – 32.
Edward Blatnik (1994). Kant's Refutation of Anti-Realism. Journal of Philosophical Research 19:127-146.
Jon Cogburn (2003). Manifest Invalidity: Neil Tennant's New Argument for Intuitionism. Synthese 134 (3):353 - 362.
Jack S. Crumley (1989). Talking Lions and Lion Talk: Davidson on Conceptual Schemes. Synthese 80 (3):347-371.
Jack S. Crumley II (1989). Talking Lions and Lion Talk: Davidson on Conceptual Schemes. Synthese 80 (3):347 - 371.
Carl Matheson (1998). Why the No-Miracles Argument Fails. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (3):263 – 279.
Josh Parsons & Jon Cogburn (2005). Wrestling with (and Without) Dialetheism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):87 – 102.
Added to index2011-01-09
Total downloads17 ( #105,105 of 1,139,891 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #165,020 of 1,139,891 )
How can I increase my downloads?