Between internalism and externalism: Husserl's account of intentionality

Inquiry 52 (1):53 – 78 (2009)
Abstract
There is a strong consensus among analytic philosophers that Husserl is an internalist and that his internalism must be understood in conjunction with his methodological solipsism. This paper focuses on Husserl's early work the, Logical Investigations , and explores whether such a reading is justified. It shows that Husserl is not a methodological solipsist: He neither believes that meaning can be reduced to the individual, nor does he assign an explanatory role for meaning to the subject. Explanatory priority is assigned to objects which have an intrinsic property independently of any access or attitude we may have to them. Although not a methodological solipsist, there are nonetheless internalist elements to Husserl's thought: He believes that we can think of non-existent objects and his account of indexicals and demonstratives shows that there are two kinds of meaning: one is context independent and internally individuated, the other is partly determined by context and so externally individuated. The paper leaves it open whether this is sufficient to mark Husserl out as an internalist. However, even if he were considered as such, we can be sure of one thing, namely, that his internalism would not be a species of methodological solipsism.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,825
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Rudolf Bernet (2004). Husserl's Transcendental Idealism Revisited. New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 4:1-20.

View all 31 references

Citations of this work BETA
Lilian Alweiss (2013). Beyond Existence and Non-Existence. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):448-469.
Lilian Alweiss (2009). The Bifurcated Subject. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (3):415 - 434.
Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-02-22

Total downloads

100 ( #12,278 of 1,100,083 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

8 ( #33,390 of 1,100,083 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.