Online research in philosophy

George Wilson has defended the thesis that even impersonal third-person fictional narratives should be taken to contain fictional narrations and have fictional narrators. This, he argues, is necessary if we are to explain how readers can take themselves, in their imaginative engagement with fictions, to have knowledge of the things they are imagining. I argue that there is at least one class of impersonal third-person fictional narratives—thought experiments—to which Wilson’s model fails to apply, and that this reveals more general problems with his argument. I further argue that there is no good reason to think that Wilson’s account applies more restrictedly to those impersonal third-person fictional narratives that feature in standard works of literary fiction.

This presentation explores the narrative personas of Jane Austen's Northanger Abbey and how the narration can affect the readers' perception of the illustrated events, characters, and society. It argues that there are two narrative voices; one voice makes opinionated comments directly to the reader and one voice relates the story objectively. The biased narrative persona can influence the readers and the impartial persona allows readers to gather their own conclusions about events, characters, and society. Northanger Abbey demonstrates the importance of the narrator as a character whose voice acts as a mediator between the reader and the action of any story.

2. An evolutionary story needs to account for a distinctive kind of judgement. (Joyce, Sayre- McCord.) It’s not just that I’m motivated to want X. If I think X is right, I regard X as required of anybody in my situation (cf Hare). (Nor is it even that I want everybody to want X—I could think that about eg listening to swing band music without this being a moral attitude.) Still, it’s not hard to see what the evolutionary story could be. We have kin selection, reciprocal altruism, mutualism and group selection to explain the evolution of behaviour that isn’t in my short-term interests—why shouldn’t these explain such behaviour via the evolution of these distinctive moral attitudes?

The intent of this chapter is to suspend the belief in the goodness of literacy -- our chirographic bias -- in order to gain a deeper understanding of how the engagement with texts structures human consciousness, and particularly the minds of children. In the following pages literacy (a term which in this chapter refers to the ability to read and produce written text) is discussed as a consciousness altering technology. A phenomenological analysis of the act of reading shows the child’s engagement with texts as a perceptual as well as a symbolic event that builds upon but also alters children’s speech acts. Speaking and reading are both forms of language use, but with different configurations of perceptual and symbolic qualities. Children’s literature uses textual technology and, intentionally or not, participates in structuring children’s pre-literate minds. Some of its forms, such as picture books and early readers, are directly intended to bridge the gap between the pre-literate listener and the literate reader and ease the transition into the literate state. It is my hope that the phenomenological analysis of the experiences of speaking and reading might help us understand more clearly how children’s literature impacts the minds of children. Such an analysis can awaken a critical awareness of the power that letters wield as they shape the reader’s psychological reality, and it can sharpen our sense of wonder about the metamorphosis of language from speaking to writing.

In this essay Suzanne Rice examines Aristotle's ideas about virtue, character, and education as elements in an Aristotelian conception of good listening. Rice begins by surveying of several different contexts in which listening typically occurs, using this information to introduce the argument that what should count as “good listening” must be determined in relation to the situation in which listening actually occurs. On this view, Rice concludes, there are no “essential” listening virtues, but rather ways of listening that may be regarded as virtuous in the context of particular concrete circumstances.

Prelude and address. I'm listening -- Author's rights, listener's rights (journal of our ancestors) -- Writing our listenings: arrangement, translation, criticism -- Our instruments for listening before the law (second journal entry) -- Listening (to listening): the making of the modern ear -- Plastic listening.

This is the story of Lisa 1 —a woman like so many others who has been abused—and of her healing journey using music and creative arts experiences. It is also a story about how music, song, poetry, art, and dance awakened her to a new consciousness and provided the necessary empowerment she needed in order to reclaim the woman she had been before experiencing the trauma of abuse. While the question of how utilization of music and the creative arts encourages personal transformation and healing is also deserving of a theoretical exploration, in this article I have chosen to foreground Lisa's story as narrative, in order to also engage the reader with the transformative potential of empowerment that comes through listening. I have chosen an approach that foregrounds Lisa's experience over theory explicitly, for, it is with the process of "finding voice" and of engaging the listener in that process, that transformation of consciousness and empowerment occurs.

The capacity for telling stories is necessary for being moral agents. The minimal necessary features for moral agency involve the capacities necessary for articulation, and articulation is a key part of what we learn and practice through telling stories. Developing the interdependence between agency and articulation, this article offers an account of both categorical moral agency and a degree-of-sophistication account of agency. Central to these are three factors: a moral agent has (1) the capacity to represent, (2) a sense of self (including a sense of self in relation to others), and (3) the normative capacity to make judgments marked by authority. Featuring an analysis of Toni Morrison’s “The Bluest Eye,” the article argues that Morrison portrays a moral sensibility emerging in the telling of the story, even in the absence of moral judgments within the text. Understanding the value of stories, fictional or factual, requires less attention to the moral value of the actions depicted within the story and more attention to the perspective and point of view developed in the narrative voice. Of most significance is the articulative process of the artist, the storyteller, the novelist, modeled for the reader, who must engage with that developing perspective.

I have been dissatisfied with Walton’s make-believe model of appreciator engagement with fiction ever since my first encounter with it as a graduate student.1 What I have always objected to is not the suggestion that such engagement is broadly speaking imaginative; rather, it is the suggestion that it specifically involves de se imaginative activity on the part of appreciators. That is, while I concede that appreciators imagine (de re) of the fictional works they experience that they are thus and so, I deny that they imagine (de se) experiencing an object that is thus and so.2 The main source of my dissatisfaction with the make-believe model is that it is phenomenologically unfamiliar; I have never been aware of de se imaginings of the requisite sort while appreciatively engaged with fiction.3 Of course, one could argue that it nevertheless occurs, albeit sub-consciously. But in order for this manoeuvre to be plausible, it would have to be established that there are appreciative phenomena that can only (or best) be explained by the supposition that appreciators engage in de se imagining, and which cannot be adequately explained by the supposition that they merely engage in de re imagining. Currie, for example, has argued that we need to make the former supposition in order to find a solution to the “problem of personality,” the problem of explaining why our emotional reactions to the plights of fictional characters often differ from our reactions to the similar plights of actual people.4 What I want to argue in this paper is that Currie’s defense of de se imaginative engagement is..

When we listen to music, what do we listen to and for? How do we listen? How well do we listen and how do we listen well? This paper suggests that ‘modes of engagement’ are the active, operational means by which listeners experience music and that listening experiences more often than not involve multiple interacting modes rather than a fixed mode throughout. Modes of engagement may be voluntarily employed or involuntarily adopted; they may be technical or descriptive; they may involve explicitly musical details and relationships, or they may seem more peripheral to the music. In the end, though, successive, simultaneous, and interacting modes of engagement are said to define unique and meaningful trajectories through music as heard.