Comments on “If it were the case that counterfactuals behaved differently in indirect reports, it might be the case that counterfactuals are context-sensitive”

Abstract
Tillman’s central thesis is that counterfactual conditionals are not context-sensitive: the propositions expressed (or semantically encoded) by counterfactual sentences do not vary with the contexts in which they are uttered.1 The main concern of Tillman’s paper is to show that arguments offered in support of the context-sensitivity of counterfactuals are unsound. In these comments, I am going to focus on the “variability argument” for context-sensitivity and Tillman’s response to it.
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