Is phenomenal pain the primary intension of 'pain'?
Metaphysica 5 (1):15-28 (2004)
| Abstract | two-dimensional modal framework introduced by Evans [2] and developed by Davies and Humberstone. [3] This framework provides Chalmers with a powerful tool for handling the most serious objection to conceivability arguments for dualism: the problem of.. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Intension Metaphysics Modal Logic Pain Phenomena | |||||||||
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Irwin Goldstein (1983). Pain and Masochism. Journal of Value Inquiry 17 (3):219-223.
Donald F. Gustafson (1998). Pain, Qualia, and the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):371-387.
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Nikola Grahek (1991). Objective and Subjective Aspects of Pain. Philosophical Psychology 4 (2):249-66.
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Peter Alward (2004). Mad, Martian, but Not Mad Martian Pain. Sorites 15 (December):73-75.
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