Graduate studies at Western
Acta Analytica 25 (3):347-363 (2009)
|Abstract||Fictional truth is commonly analyzed in terms of the speech acts or propositional attitudes of a teller. In this paper, I investigate Lewisâs counterfactual analysis in terms of felicitous narrator assertion, Currieâs analysis in terms of fictional author belief, and Byrneâs analysis in terms of ideal author invitations to make-believeâand find them all lacking. I propose instead an analysis in terms of the revelations of an infelicitous narrator|
|Keywords||Fiction Truth Make-believe Lewis Currie Byrne|
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