That’s the Fictional Truth, Ruth

Acta Analytica 25 (3):347-363 (2010)
Fictional truth is commonly analyzed in terms of the speech acts or propositional attitudes of a teller. In this paper, I investigate Lewis’s counterfactual analysis in terms of felicitous narrator assertion, Currie’s analysis in terms of fictional author belief, and Byrne’s analysis in terms of ideal author invitations to make-believe—and find them all lacking. I propose instead an analysis in terms of the revelations of an infelicitous narrator
Keywords Fiction  Truth  Make-believe  Lewis  Currie  Byrne
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-009-0071-3
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1978). Truth in Fiction. American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1):37--46.
Andrew Kania (2005). Against the Ubiquity of Fictional Narrators. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63 (1):47–54.

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Citations of this work BETA
Peter Alward (2011). Description, Disagreement, and Fictional Names. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):423-448.

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