That's the Fictional Truth, Ruth

Acta Analytica 25 (3):347-363 (2009)
Abstract
Fictional truth is commonly analyzed in terms of the speech acts or propositional attitudes of a teller. In this paper, I investigate Lewis’s counterfactual analysis in terms of felicitous narrator assertion, Currie’s analysis in terms of fictional author belief, and Byrne’s analysis in terms of ideal author invitations to make-believe—and find them all lacking. I propose instead an analysis in terms of the revelations of an infelicitous narrator
Keywords Fiction  Truth  Make-believe  Lewis  Currie  Byrne
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References found in this work BETA
Peter Alward (2009). Onstage Illocution. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 67 (3):321 - 331.
Alex Byrne (1993). Truth in Fiction: The Story Continued. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (1):24 – 35.
Gregory Currie (1986). Fictional Truth. Philosophical Studies 50 (2):195 - 212.

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