Acceptable Contradictions: Pragmatics or Semantics? A Reply to Cobreros et al [Book Review]

Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (4):619-634 (2013)
Abstract
Naive speakers find some logical contradictions acceptable, specifically borderline contradictions involving vague predicates such as Joe is and isn’t tall. In a recent paper, Cobreros et al. (J Philos Logic, 2012) suggest a pragmatic account of the acceptability of borderline contradictions. We show, however, that the pragmatic account predicts the wrong truth conditions for some examples with disjunction. As a remedy, we propose a semantic analysis instead. The analysis is close to a variant of fuzzy logic, but conjunction and disjunction are interpreted as intensional operators
Keywords Contradiction  Vagueness  Fuzzy logic  Pragmatics  Natural language  Conjunction
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    Petr Hajek, Fuzzy Logic. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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