Second-Personal Respect, the Experiential Aspect of Respect, and Feminist Philosophy

Hypatia 25 (2):316 - 333 (2010)
I argue that Stephen Darwall's account of second-personal respect should be of special interest to feminists because it opens up space for the development of certain feminist resources. Specifically, Darwall's account leaves room for an experiential aspect of respect, and I suggest that abilities related to this aspect may vary along with social position. I then point out a potential parallel between the feminist critique of epistemology and a budding feminist critique of moral philosophy (specifically relating to respect)
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References found in this work BETA
Sarah Buss (1999). Respect for Persans. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):517-550.
Stephen Darwall (2004). Respect and the Second-Person Standpoint. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 78 (2):43 - 59.

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