Online research in philosophy

It is often said that we can know our own thoughts more directly or with more certainty than anyone else can know them. And this disparity is usually taken to be principled, in that we would not be the rational, reflective beings that we are without it. My aim is to trace the consequences of a principled disparity between self-knowledge and other-knowledge for what may be termed the “mechanics ” of self-knowledge . I use a new thought experiment to show that if introspective states are merely causally related to introspected thoughts, the disparity between self-knowledge and other-knowledge is not truly principled. An account of self-knowledge adequate to a truly principled disparity will allow that thought tokens can be.

This paper argues that the foundations of our knowledge are the bed-rock certainties of ordinary life, what may be called the Moorean truths. Beyond that are the well-established results within the empirical sciences, and whatever has been proved in the rational sciences of mathematics and logic. Otherwise there is only belief, which may be more or less rational. A moral drawn from this is that dogmatism should be moderated on all sides.

This five volume collection brings together a carefully selected array of contributions from a variety of disciplines. Featuring essays from philosophers who have investigated the foundations of knowledge, and addressing different forms of knowledge in society such as common sense and practical knowledge, this collection also discusses the role of knowledge in economic process and gives attention to the role of expert knowledge in political decision making. Including a collection of articles from the sociology of knowledge and science, the set also provides a new introduction and full index by the editors, making it a unique and invaluable research resource for both student and scholar. Coverage includes: 1. Foundations of Knowledge - Knowledge, Experience and Mind - Knowledge and Reality - Knowledge and Skepticism - Knowledge and Ignorance - Knowledge and Uncertainty 2: Knowledge and Society: Forms of Knowledge - Everyday Knowledge - Practical knowledge - Tacit knowledge - Secret Knowledge - Scientific Knowledge - Hermeneutics - Knowledge Construction - Indigenous (traditional) knowledge 3: Knowledge and the Economy - The Economics of Knowledge - Knowledge and Organisations - Knowledge Acquisition - Knowledge Based Systems (firms) - Knowledge Management - Knowledge and Information - Knowledge and Law 4: Politics and Knowledge - Science and Policy-Making - The Power of Ideas and Discourse - The Politics of Knowledge 5: Sociology of Knowledge and Science - Classical Perspectives - Modern Views - Science Studies.

Aims This is the first half of ‘Knowledge and Reality’. The aim of this course is to give you a good, broad introduction to some of the key themes in epistemology (the theory of knowledge). Now, epistemology is a big subject, and in one term we have to be selective. Our strategy will be to start with questions about what knowledge is, we’ll then move on to raise some issues about the justification of our beliefs, and how this has implications for thinking about the ‘structure’ of knowledge. We’ll cover quite a few ‘-isms’ that are central to epistemology: internalism; externalism; foundationalism; empiricism; scepticism; naturalism, and, en route we will look at different sources of knowledge (e.g., perception; introspection; testimony). The first 6 lectures focus on what we might call the ‘classical’ tradition in epistemology (from Descartes onwards), one that is individualistic, and bound up with individual subjects and their subjective points of view. In the final three lectures we examine various contemporary epistemological debates about whether this ‘classical’, Cartesian, epistemology is correct (see “core readings” below for list of weekly topics).

Testimony is responsible, either directly or indirectly, for much of what we know, not only about the world around us but also about who we are. Despite its relative historical neglect, recent work in epistemology has seen a growing recognition of the importance and scope of testimonial knowledge. Most of this work has focused on two central questions, which will be the main topics of this article. First, is testimonial knowledge necessarily acquired through transmission from speaker to hearer, or can testimony generate epistemic features in its own right? Second, is justified dependence on testimony fundamentally basic, or is it ultimately reducible to other epistemic sources, such as perception, memory, and reason? Testimony itself is typically understood quite broadly so as to include a variety of acts of communication that are intended or taken to convey information—such as statements, nods, pointings, and so on. (For a full development of this view, see Lackey 2008.) Knowledge that is distinctively testimonial requires belief that is based or grounded in, not merely caused by, an instance of testimony. For instance, suppose that I sing “I have a soprano voice” in a soprano voice and you come to believe this entirely on the basis of hearing my soprano voice. (This is a variation of an example found in Audi 1997.) While my testimony is certainly causally relevant to the formation of your belief, the resulting knowledge is based on your hearing my soprano voice rather than on what I testified to, thereby rendering it perceptual in nature. What is of import for distinctively testimonial knowledge is that a given belief be formed on the basis of the content of a speaker’s testimony. This prevents beliefs that are formed entirely on the basis of features about a speaker’s testimony from qualifying as instances of testimonial knowledge.

It is argued that geometrical intuition, as conceived in Kant, is still crucial to the epistemological foundations of mathematics. For this purpose, I have chosen to target one of the most sympathetic interpreters of Kant's philosophy of mathematics – Michael Friedman – because he has formulated the possible historical limitations of Kant's views most sharply. I claim that there are important insights in Kant's theory that have survived the developments of modern mathematics, and thus, that they are not so intrinsically bound up with the logic and mathematics of Kant's time as Friedman will have it. These insights include the idea that mathematical knowledge relies on the manipulation of objects given in quasi-perceptual intuition, as Charles Parsons has argued, and that pure intuition is a source of knowledge of space itself that cannot be replaced by mere propositional knowledge. In particular, it is pointed out that it is the isomorphism between Kantian intuition and a spatial manifold that underlies both the epistemic intimacy of the most fundamental type of geometrical intuition as well as that of perceptual acquaintance.

Philosophy and curriculum planning.--The nature and structure of curriculum objectives.--Liberal education and the nature of knowledge.--Realms of meaning and forms of knowledge.--Language and thought.--The forms of knowledge re-visited.--What is teaching?--The logical and psychological aspects of teaching a subject.--Curriculum integration.--Literature and the fine arts as a unique form of knowledge.--The two-cultures, science and moral education.--Morals, religion and the maintained school.

The grand and sweeping claims of many relativists might seem to amount to the argument that everything is relative—except the thesis of relativism. In this book, Steven Hales defends relativism, but in a more circumscribed form that applies specifically to philosophical propositions. His claim is that philosophical propositions are relatively true—true in some perspectives and false in others. Hales defends this argument first by examining rational intuition as the method by which philosophers come to have the beliefs they do. Analytic rationalism, he claims, has a foundational reliance on rational intuition as a method of acquiring basic beliefs. He then argues that there are other methods that people use to gain beliefs about philosophical topics that are strikingly analogous to rational intuition and examines two of these: Christian revelation and the ritual use of hallucinogens. Hales argues that rational intuition is not epistemically superior to either of these alternative methods. There are only three possible outcomes: we have no philosophical knowledge (skepticism); there are no philosophical propositions (naturalism); or there are knowable philosophical propositions, but our knowledge of them is relative to doxastic perspective. Hales defends relativism against the charge that it is self-refuting and answers a variety of objections to this account of relativism. Finally, he examines the most sweeping objection to relativism: that philosophical propositions are not merely relatively true, because there are no philosophical propositions—all propositions are ultimately empirical, as the naturalists contend. Hales's somewhat disturbing conclusion—that intuition-driven philosophy does produce knowledge, but not absolute knowledge—is sure to inspire debate among philosophers.

Paul Moser's book defends what has been an unfashionable view in recent epistemology: the foundationalist account of knowledge and justification. Since the time of Plato philosophers have wondered what exactly knowledge is. This book develops a new account of perceptual knowledge which specifies the exact sense in which knowledge has foundations. The author argues that experiential foundations are indeed essential to perceptual knowledge, and he explains what knowledge requires beyond justified true beliefs. In challenging prominent sceptical claims that we have no justified beliefs about the external world, the book outlines a theory of rational belief.

The paper emphasizes the role of knowledge dimensions of an action which could be regarded as rational. Rational action usually results of specific decision — making process including selection, evaluation and acceptance of a preferred alternative. This process should integrate not only various types of knowledge but also the interdisciplinary or interdepartmental knowledge integration. The integration of knowledge may cover various forms, especially integration of knowledge relating to different domains, of different quality, of knowledge connected with different goal-orientations. The paper stresses the role of the hitherto known and recognized alternatives. The integration procedures should also include the integration of various spheres and types of knowledge with accepted and justified systems of values.