Kant and Hegel on freedom: Two new interpretations

Inquiry 35 (2):219 – 232 (1992)
Can Kant's theory of freedom be defended in contemporary "incompatibilist" terms, as Henry Allison believes, or is it vulnerable to Hegelian criticisms of the "compatibilist" sort that Allen Wood presents? I argue that the answer to both of these questions is negative, and that there is a third option, namely that Kant's real theory of freedom is not as well off as Allison contends, nor as weak as Wood claims. Allison tries to save Kant's theory of freedom from both what he takes to be traditional and improper interpretations, notably including Hegel's and Wood's, of what that theory means, as well as from traditional and improper objections to its defensibility. I argue in part with Wood (and Hegel) against Allison on the issue of the meaning of Kant's theory, and in part with Allison against Wood (and Hegel) on the issue of the defensibility of Kant's theory.
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DOI 10.1080/00201749208602289
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Karl Ameriks (1985). Hegel's Critique of Kant's Theoretical Philosophy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (1):1-35.

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