Kant's Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument

Kant-Studien 69 (1-4):273-287 (1978)
Abstract
Major recent interpretations of Kant's first "critique" (wolff, Strawson, Bennett) have taken his transcendental deduction to be an argument from the fact of consciousness to the existence of an objective world. I argue that it is unclear such an argument can succeed and there are overwhelming reasons to believe kant understood his deduction as having a very different form, namely as moving from the premise that there is empirical knowledge to the conclusion that there are universally valid pure categories. Detailed support for this contention is offered in an analysis of the second edition version of the deduction.
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Citations of this work BETA
Mark Sacks (2005). The Nature of Transcendental Arguments. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (4):439 – 460.
John J. Callanan (2006). Kant's Transcendental Strategy. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):360–381.
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