Plantinga and other minds

Southern Journal of Philosophy 16 (4):285-91 (1973)
Abstract
Alvin plantinga has presented various counterexamples to the argument from analogy for other minds. I argue that the implausibility of the counterexample inferences plantinga offers depends not on a weakness essential to the analogical argument but rather on features peculiar to the inferences he provides. My procedure is to establish a number of necessary conditions for any acceptable analogical argument and then to show plantinga's counterexamples fail to meet these conditions. I then construct an analogical argument for other minds which meets all these conditions and hence appears acceptable and invulnerable to plantinga's objections. Other responses to plantinga are also criticized
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