Why are the laws of physics the way they are?

Why are the laws of physics the way they are? A causal answer argues to the laws from something physically more fundamental. For example,string theory is pursuing that kind of argument. I argue for a purposive answer to our question. Why are the laws of physics the way they are? In order for the universe to be knowable through empirical inquiry by embodied rational inquirers. The argument has three parts: the physics, the move from physics to metaphysics, the metaphysics. The starting point in physics is the derivation of extremum principles for physics from Fisher informaiton. The argument is not based on 'fine-tuning’, anthropic principles, intelligent design, or a ‘god of the gaps’ argument. This purposive answer specifies a purpose to which the universe is ordered and so explains why the laws of physics are the way they are. This is a metaphysics of inquiry and logically cannot be in conflict with empirical inquiry. It is therefore not a 'science stopper'. The argument blocks the inference from ‘blind’ to 'purposeless’. As an ‘argument to design’, criticisms by Kant, Hume and Dawkins of the ‘argument from design’ do not apply.
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