Online research in philosophy

The paper in this volume challenge the concept of form and aim to set out, explore and develop different theories and examples of 'the formless'.

This essay seeks to ground the ontological integrity of natural things by examining the dialectic between substantial form, which is the “being-in-itself ”of substances, and second acts, the “being-toward-others” of substances. It is found that a new category of causality needs to be established, that of “expressivecausality.” The effects of expressive causality—second acts—are expressions of their substantial form, their cause. It is determined that second acts are sufficientconditions for substantial form, while substantial form itself is a necessary condition for its second acts. This implies that substantial form is ontologically priorto its second acts, which are proper attributes. These proper attributes are distinct from yet essentially connected with substantial form, and can never exhaust thecontent of the form.

Examination of the concept of "form" within Lukacs' work and after Lukacs.

Important philosophical volume by foremost architectural conceptualist emphasizes organic design, interrelated study of all arts. He provides introductory, retrospective, and prospective analysis, explores the creative instinct, organic order, form and vitality, form and time, form and logic, form and function, the dogmatic, mechanized, and the creative mind, and more.

First we prove that the set of countable linear orders of the form I + I form a complete analytic set. As a consequence of this we improve a result of Humke and Laczkovich, who showed in [HL] that the set of functions of the form f ⚬ f form a true analytic set in C[0, 1]. We show that these functions form a complete analytic set, solving a problem mentioned on p. 215 of [K1] and on p. 4 of [B].

One form of argument from analogy is identified and Stephen Barker's remarks about a second kind of argument from analogy, non-inductive (and non-deductive) argument from analogy, are used as a springboard to identify a second form. That form is then refined, explained, exemplified, and related to the first form. It is argued that there is a spectrum of different forms of argument from analogy, with the two forms identified being end points on the spectrum. Except in terms of form, however, there is no reason to speak of two different kinds of argument from analogy.

This work contains Peter Long's important essay, Logic, Form and Grammar , which resolves many difficulties for the logical form of an argument where the reasoning is hypothetical. Also included are two essays on classical problems in philosophical logic, relating to logical form and formal relations.

Over the years, I’ve been asked many times what “logical form” is, as applied to natural language. This is a natural enough question to address to me; after all, I’ve written a book titled Logical Form, and I’ve been asked to write any number of papers on the topic. This question, it seems to me, is certainly a “big” question, and big questions deserve big answers. I must admit, however, to being somewhat baffled as to how to do this satisfactorily, since big answers to big questions unfortunately tend to the trivial. With a nod to Wittgenstein, logical form has always seemed to me to be something that you know it when you see it; it is clear enough when it pops up, but one is hard pressed to say just what it is, to define it. This is so even though the meanings of the words “logical” and “form” seem straightforward enough; what I find puzzling is how the first word is supposed to modify the second. What is it that makes a form logical, as opposed to something else that is not logical? This, it seems to me, is a very hard question to answer indeed, for if we cannot contrast logical form with some other type of form, then every form (or no form) is a logical form, and we have arrived at the triviality previously mentioned.

‘Good’ is nothing specific but is transcendentally or generally applied over specific, and specified, ‘categories’. These ‘categories’ may be seen—at least for the purposes of this note—as under Platonic Forms. The rule that instances under a category or form need a Form to be under is valid. It may be tautological: but this is OK for rules. Not being specific, however, ‘good’ neither needs nor can have a specifying Form. So, on these grounds, the Form of the Good is otious. Any rule of the kind, ‘Everything needs a Form, so good needs a Form of the Good’ is mistaken, in that good is not a kind, but a transcendental. To give a Form to the transcendental ‘good’ is a mistake: it is a Rylian category mistake. And the Form of the Good either does no work, or works unprofitably in any but an aesthetic sense.