David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Kagaku Tetsugaku 41 (1):79-94 (2008)
Gerd Gigerenzer's views on probabilistic reasoning in humans have come under close scrutiny. Very little attention, however, has been paid to his evolutionary component of his argument. According to Gigerenzer, reasoning about probabilities as frequencies is so common today because it was favored by natural selection in the past. This paper presents a critical examination of this argument. It will show first, that, _pace_ Gigerenzer, there are some reasons to believe that using the frequency format was not more adaptive than using the standard (percentage) format and, second, that Gigerenzer's evolutionary argument and his other arguments such as his historical description of the notion of probability are in tension with each other.
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References found in this work BETA
L. Cosmides (1996). Are Humans Good Intuitive Statisticians After All? Rethinking Some Conclusions From the Literature on Judgment Under Uncertainty. Cognition 58 (1):1-73.
David M. Eddy (1982). Probabilistic Reasoning in Clinical Medicine: Problems and Opportunities. In Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press. 249--267.
Gerd Gigerenzer (2001). Content-Blind Norms, No Norms, or Good Norms? A Reply to Vranas. Cognition 81 (1):93-103.
V. Girotto (2002). Chances and Frequencies in Probabilistic Reasoning: Rejoinder to Hoffrage, Gigerenzer, Krauss, and Martignon. Cognition 84 (3):353-359.
Vittorio Girotto & Michel Gonzalez (2001). Solving Probabilistic and Statistical Problems: A Matter of Information Structure and Question Form. Cognition 78 (3):247-276.
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