Ape Autonomy? Social norms and moral agency in other species
| Abstract | Once upon a time, not too long ago, the question about apes and ethics had to do with moral standing—do apes have interests or rights that humans ought to respect? Given the fifty years of research on great ape cognition, life history, social organization, and behavior, the answer to that question seems obvious. Apes have emotions and projects, they can be harmed, and they have important social relationships | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,711 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Only published papers are available at libraries |
Marc Bekoff (1997). Deep Ethology, Animal Rights, and the Great Ape/Animal Project: Resisting Speciesism and Expanding the Community of Equals. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 10 (3):269-296.
Oliver Putz (2009). Moral Apes, Human Uniqueness, and the Image of God. Zygon 44 (3):613-624.
Logi Gunnarsson (2008). The Great Apes and the Severely Disabled: Moral Status and Thick Evaluative Concepts. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):305 - 326.
Claudia Rudolf von Rohr, Judith Burkart & Carel van Schaik (2011). Evolutionary Precursors of Social Norms in Chimpanzees: A New Approach. Biology and Philosophy 26 (1):1-30.
Adam Kolber (2002). Standing Upright: The Moral and Legal Standing of Humans and Other Apes. Stanford Law Review 54:163-204.
Josep Call (2011). How Artificial Communication Affects the Communication and Cognition of the Great Apes. Mind and Language 26 (1):1-20.
Jos de Mul (2010). Moral Machines. Techné 14 (3):226-236.
Michael Tomasello, Malinda Carpenter, Josep Call, Tanya Behne & Henrike Moll (2005). Understanding and Sharing Intentions: The Origins of Cultural Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):675-691.
Andrews Reath (2006). Agency and Autonomy in Kant's Moral Theory. Oxford University Press.
Jean Chambers (2001). A Cybernetic Theory of Morality and Moral Autonomy. Science and Engineering Ethics 7 (2).
Rick O.’Neil (1997). Intrinsic Value, Moral Standing, and Species. Environmental Ethics 19 (1):45-52.
Rick O.’Neil (1997). Intrinsic Value, Moral Standing, and Species. Environmental Ethics 19 (1):45-52.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2012-04-27Total downloads18 ( #67,674 of 551,054 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,341 of 551,054 )How can I increase my downloads? |

