Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):90 – 108 (2003)
|Abstract||It has been argued - most prominently in Harry Frankfurt's recent work - that the normative authority of personal commitments derives not from their intrinsic worth but from the way in which one's will is invested in what one cares about. In this essay, I argue that even if this approach is construed broadly and supplemented in various ways, its intrasubjective character leaves it ill-prepared to explain the normative grip of commitments in cases of purported self-betrayal. As an alternative, I sketch a view that focuses on intersubjective constraints of intelligibility built into social practices and on the pragmatics of how those norms are contested in an ongoing fashion|
|Keywords||Autonomy Normativity Charles Taylor Harry Frankfurt Second-order desires Self-interpretation|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Joseph Rouse (2007). Social Practices and Normativity. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 (1):46-56.
Christine M. Korsgaard (1996). The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge University Press.
Nicholas Southwood (2008). Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality. Ethics 119 (1):9-30.
John J. Davenport (2007). Augustine on Liberty of the Higher-Order Will. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81:67-89.
Christian Coons & David Faraci (2010). First-Personal Authority and the Normativity of Rationality. Philosophia 38 (4):733-740.
Joel Anderson (2008). Disputing Autonomy: Second-Order Desires and the Dynamics of Ascribing Autonomy. SATS 9 (1):7-26.
Dennis Loughrey (1998). Second-Order Desire Accounts of Autonomy. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (2):211 – 229.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads63 ( #17,875 of 739,367 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #26,423 of 739,367 )
How can I increase my downloads?