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- Joel Anderson (forthcoming). Autonomy Gaps as a Social Pathology: Ideologiekritik Beyond Paternalism. In Rainer Forst (ed.), Sozialphilosophie und Kritik. Suhrkamp.From the outset, critical social theory has sought to diagnose people’s participation in their own oppression, by revealing the roots of irrational and self-undermining choices in the complex interplay between human nature, social structures, and cultural beliefs. As part of this project, Ideologiekritik has aimed to expose faulty conceptions of this interplay, so that the objectively pathological character of what people are “freely” choosing could come more clearly into view. The challenge, however, has always been to find a way of doing this without arrogantly assuming special access to what is good for people. And this danger of paternalism is one to which social theorists have all too often fallen prey. In this brief essay, I focus on contemporary instances of clearly self-defeating behavior in contexts of complex choices. I begin by discussing a recent attempt to diagnose and solve these failures of choices, namely the public policy recommendations of behavioral economist Richard Thaler and reform-minded legal theorist Cass Sunstein. Their influential “libertarian paternalist” approach is particularly interesting, both in what it includes (attention to the socially constructed nature of choice situations and the roots of the problems in human nature) and in what it leaves out (an understanding of the social construction of human nature and an adequate appreciation of the value of autonomy). After discussing it, I consider a broadly perfectionist alternative, to the effect that the problem lies in a failure to adequately appreciate the importance of developing autonomy. I then turn to sketching the outlines of a new approach, based on the concept of “autonomy gaps,” which approaches overly demanding policies in relational and action-theoretical terms. In the final section, I show how this provides the basis for an analysis both in terms of a critique of ideology and of social pathology.
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In recent years the concepts of individual autonomy and political liberalism have been the subjects of intense debate, but these discussions have occurred largely within separate academic disciplines. Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism contains for the first time new essays devoted to foundational questions regarding both the notion of the autonomous self and the nature and justification of liberalism. Written by leading figures in moral, legal and political theory, the volume covers inter alia the following topics: the nature of the self and its relation to autonomy, the social dimensions of autonomy and the political dynamics of respect and recognition, and the concept of autonomy underlying the principles of liberalism.
University of Utrecht, Department of Philosophy, Heidelberglaan 6, 3584 CS Utrecht, The Netherlands. Tel.: +31 (0)30 253 28 74, Email: Thomas.Nys{at}phil.uu.nl ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> Abstract Measures in public health care (PHC) seem vulnerable to charges of paternalism: their aim is to protect, restore, or promote people's health, but the public character of these measures seems to leave insufficient room for respect for individual autonomy. This paper wants to explore three challenges to these charges: (i) Measures in PHC are aimed to protect, restore or promote ‘deep autonomy’, (ii) Measures in PHC are directed at the public and, as such, they do show respect for autonomy, and (iii) Some measures in PHC can be justified on grounds of justice and need not be defended as cases of ‘justified paternalism’. Although charges of unjustified paternalism in PHC might still be relevant, we should at least face these different challenges. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
The concept of individual autonomy is one of the most frequently utilized--and perhaps least understood--terms of current moral, political, and legal debate. The first anthology devoted entirely to this philosophical concept, The Inner Citadel includes both extensive discussions of autonomy itself and theoretical applications of autonomy to various areas of philosophical inquiry. John Christman has assembled essays, many appearing in print for the first time, by such eminent philosophers as Gerald Dworkin, Joel Feinberg, Harry Frankfurt, and David A. J. Richards. Together, these essays provide the necessary foundation for the myriad debates and controversies in areas such as bioethics, feminism, and paternalism whose resolution turns on the nature and value of individual autonomy. As the idea of autonomy is central to such a wide range of philosophical issues and impinges on other disciplines as well, The Inner Citadel will be essential for courses in moral, political, social, and legal philosophy, as well as a valuable resource for students of law, political science, and psychology.
Autonomy, the preeminent value in bioethics since the 1970s, has come under increasing attack in recent years. One outcome of this attack is that many bioethicists now recognize that the presumption in favor of autonomy can be rebutted for hard paternalistic reasons, at least under some circumstances. Unfortunately, bioethicists have failed to specify those circumstances. Yet, this failure is understandable. There is a conceptual obstacle to establishing systematic criteria for the justifiability of hard paternalism: there is no adequate definition of hard paternalism. If we aren't clear about which acts are correctly described as hard paternalistic acts, then we cannot coherently morally assess hard paternalism. In this paper, I address this problem, offering a comprehensive definition of hard paternalism. Specifically, I argue that six factors must be considered. (1) Presently, hard paternalism is typically defined only in terms of whether the subject's conduct is substantially autonomous. Thus, if the subject acts substantially free from cognitive and volitional defects, then interference with her action is hard paternalism. But hard paternalism must also be defined in terms of: (2) the identity of the paternalistic agent and the agent's relationship to the subject, (3) the motive of the paternalistic agent in restricting the subject, (4) the manner in which the agent restricts the subject, (5) the nature of the subject's restricted conduct, and (6) the importance of the restricted conduct to the subject.
When Catriona MacKenzie and Natalie Stoljar published their anthology Relational Autonomy in 2000, their aim was to rehabilitate the concept of autonomy for feminist theory by focusing attention on its social dimensions and disentangling it from suspect ideals of radical independence and self-reliance. Since then, the concept of relational autonomy has gained considerable currency—not just among feminist philosophers, but also among an increasing number of participants in the wider debate. As others have pointed out, the phrase “relational autonomy” does not name a single view, but instead designates a loosely related collection of views that share an emphasis on the social embeddedness of the self and on the social structures and relations that make autonomy possible.1 This renewed focus on relational concepts has surely enriched and deepened our thinking about the nature and conditions of individual agency, both within feminist theory and without.
From Hippocrates to paternalism to autonomy : the new hegemony -- From autonomy to consent -- Consent, autonomy, and the law -- Autonomy at the end of life -- Autonomy and pregnancy -- Autonomy and genetic information -- Autonomy and organ transplantation -- Autonomy, consent, and the law.
This important new book develops a new concept of autonomy. The notion of autonomy has emerged as central to contemporary moral and political philosophy, particularly in the area of applied ethics. Professor Dworkin examines the nature and value of autonomy and used the concept to analyze various practical moral issues such as proxy consent in the medical context, paternalism, and entrapment by law enforcement officials.
I define paternalism in the following way. X behaves paternalistically towards y: (1) only if x aims to close an option that would otherwise be open to y, or x chooses for y in the event that y is unable to choose for himself; and (2) to the extent that x does so in order to promote y's good. Paternalism covers both acts and omissions and may be successful or unsuccessful, and I distinguish it from benevolence. This definition is contrasted with some alternatives offered by others, including Gerald Dworkin, John Kleinig and David Archard. On my account, paternalism need not be coercive, nor restrict freedom. Paternalism need not be against the will, nor need it limit the autonomy, of the person paternalised, nor involve the violation of any moral rule. Finally, a paternalist may believe both that paternalistic intervention is for the good of the target and that the target shares this view.
We offer a critique of one prominent understanding of the principle of respect for autonomy and of analyses of medical paternalism based on that understanding. Our main critique is that understanding respect for autonomy as respect for freedom from interference is mistaken because it is overly influenced by four-alarm cases, because it fails to appreciate the full dimensions of legal self-determination (one of its main sources), because it conflates the research and therapeutic settings, and because it fails to appreciate themes of authority and power that have historically shaped the principle of respect for freedom from interference. We argue that respect for autonomy involves more than just freedom from interference and, on this basis, offer a critique of prevailing accounts of medical paternalism.
This book offers a thorough reflection on the relationship between autonomy and paternalism, and argues that, from both theoretical and practical angles, the ...
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