Another solution to the problem of theoretical terms

Erkenntnis 69 (3):315 - 333 (2008)
Abstract
In this paper, a solution to the problem of theoretical terms is developed that is based on Carnap’s doctrine of indirect interpretation of theoretical terms. This doctrine will be given a semantic, model-theoretic explanation that is not given by Carnap himself as he remains content with a syntactic explanation. From that semantic explanation, rules for the truth-value assignment to postulates, i.e. sentences that determine the meaning of theoretical terms, are derived. The logical status of postulates will be clarified thereby in such a way that the problem of theoretical terms disappears.
Keywords Philosophy   Logic   Ethics   Ontology   Epistemology   Philosophy
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References found in this work BETA
Jeffrey Ketland (2004). Empirical Adequacy and Ramsification. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):287-300.
Michael Dummett (1982). Realism. Synthese 52 (1):145--165.

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Citations of this work BETA
Holger Andreas & Georg Schiemer (2016). A Choice-Semantical Approach to Theoretical Truth. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 58:1-8.

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