Best candidates and theories of identity

Inquiry 29 (1-4):423-438 (1986)
Abstract
Attacks on ?closest continuer? and ?best candidate? theories of identity have something correct in them while still failing to discredit the theories they oppose. What follows from Noonan's and Wiggins's objections to such theories is that they need to be so formulated as not to deny the necessity of identity. The best metaphysics for best?candidate theories to adopt is one in which everyday objects are taken to transcend, in a certain sense, their life histories in given worlds. This metaphysics also has the potential for solving problems about contingent identity, transworld identity, and the issue of haecceitism or individual essence. To develop the metaphysics, it is only necessary to follow through the analogy between worlds and times suggested by writers like Plantinga and Schlesinger
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References found in this work BETA
Allan Gibbard (1975). Contingent Identity. Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (2):187-222.
Allan Gibbard (1997). Contingent Identity1. In Michael C. Rea (ed.), Material Constitution. Rowman & Littlefield. 93.

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