Journal of Philosophical Research 20:451-462 (1995)
|Abstract||In her article “Asymmetrical Freedom,” and more recently in her book Freedom Within Reason, Susan Wolf claims to have given us a new theory to account for when we can be held morally responsible for our actions. I believe that she has confused “being morally responsible for an action” with “acting responsibly or irresponsibly.” I will argue that Wolf has given us a nice analysis of the latter concepts, but not of the former one as she intended. I do not believe that she is alone in not appreciating the distinction between these different concepts, but I wiII focus on her work as being a particularly good example of how confusing them can lead to an incorrect account of moral responsibility|
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