Conditionals and conditional thinking

Mind and Society 7 (1):21-34 (2008)
In this paper, we claim that the problem of conditionals should be dealt with by carefully distinguishing between thinking conditional propositions and conditional thinking, i.e. thinking on the basis of some supposition. This distinction deserves further investigation, if we are to make sense of some old and new experimental data concerning the understanding and the assertion of conditional sentences. Here we will argue that some of these data seem to refute the mental models theory of conditional reasoning, setting the ground for a different approach to the cognitive study of conditionals
Keywords Conditionals  Conditional probability  Assertability  Ramsey’s test  Reasoning  Mental models
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11299-007-0032-8
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,217
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
P. N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (1991). Deduction. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
W. V. Quine (1982). Methods of Logic. Harvard University Press.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

33 ( #143,658 of 1,932,483 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #197,457 of 1,932,483 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.