Conditionals and conditional thinking

Mind and Society 7 (1):21-34 (2008)
Abstract
In this paper, we claim that the problem of conditionals should be dealt with by carefully distinguishing between thinking conditional propositions and conditional thinking, i.e. thinking on the basis of some supposition. This distinction deserves further investigation, if we are to make sense of some old and new experimental data concerning the understanding and the assertion of conditional sentences. Here we will argue that some of these data seem to refute the mental models theory of conditional reasoning, setting the ground for a different approach to the cognitive study of conditionals
Keywords Conditionals  Conditional probability  Assertability  Ramsey’s test  Reasoning  Mental models
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References found in this work BETA
Dorothy Edgington, Conditionals. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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