Coconsciousness and numerical identity of the person

Philosophical Studies 30 (July):1-10 (1976)
The phenomenon of multiple personality--Like the "split-Brain" phenomenon--Involves a disintegration of the normally unified self to the point where one must question whether there is one, Or more than one, Person associated with the body even at a single moment in time. Besides the traditional problem of determining identity over time, There is now a new problem of personal identity--Determining identity at a single moment in time. We need the conceptual apparatus to talk about this new problem and a test, Like the one I propose, For determining the number of persons associated with a body at a single moment in time.
Keywords Brain Processes  Consciousness  Epistemology  Personal Identity  Personality  Sperry, R
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00355279
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,658
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
John C. Eccles (1981). Mental Dualism and Commissurotomy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (1):105.
Eric T. Olson (2003). Was Jekyll Hyde? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):328-348.
Patricia Smith Churchland (1981). How Many Angels…? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (1):103.

View all 21 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

78 ( #43,354 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

11 ( #61,095 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.