Coconsciousness and numerical identity of the person

Philosophical Studies 30 (July):1-10 (1976)
Abstract
The phenomenon of multiple personality--Like the "split-Brain" phenomenon--Involves a disintegration of the normally unified self to the point where one must question whether there is one, Or more than one, Person associated with the body even at a single moment in time. Besides the traditional problem of determining identity over time, There is now a new problem of personal identity--Determining identity at a single moment in time. We need the conceptual apparatus to talk about this new problem and a test, Like the one I propose, For determining the number of persons associated with a body at a single moment in time
Keywords Brain Processes  Consciousness  Epistemology  Personal Identity  Personality  Sperry, R
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Eric T. Olson (2003). Was Jekyll Hyde? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):328-348.
Eric T. Olson (2003). Was Jekyll Hyde? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):328 - 348.

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