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- Michael Anderson, Chapter Five.Basics of Embodied Cognition EC treats cognition as a set of tools evolved by organisms for coping with their environments. Each of the key terms in this characterization—tool, evolved, organisms, coping, and environment—has a special significance for, and casts a particular light on, the study of the mind. EC thereby foregrounds the following six facts.No categories
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The nature of cognition is being re-considered. Instead of emphasizing formal operations on abstract symbols, the new approach foregrounds the fact that cognition is, rather, a situated activity, and suggests that thinking beings ought therefore be considered first and foremost as acting beings. The essay reviews recent work in Embodied Cognition, provides a concise guide to its principles, attitudes and goals, and identifies the physical grounding project as its central research focus.
Machine generated contents note: Chapter 1 Acknowledgments -- Chapter 2 Introduction: The Chatter of the Present -- Chapter 3 Definitions of Solitude -- Chapter 4 Distraction: The Flip Side of Engagement -- Chapter 5 Antigone: Literature as "Thinking Apart" -- Chapter 6 The Workshop Model in New York City -- Chapter 7 The Folly of the "Big Idea" -- Chapter 8 The Cult of Success -- Chapter 9 Mass Personalization and the "Underground Man" -- Chapter 10 The Need for Loneliness -- Chapter 11 The Practice of Solitude -- Chapter 12 Discernment and the Public Sphere -- Chapter 13 Conclusion: Setting up Shop -- Chapter 14 Bibliography -- Chapter 15 About the Author -- Chapter 16 Index.
We argue that the locomotion of organisms is better understood as a form of interaction with a subjective environment, rather than as a set of behaviors allegedly amenable to objective descriptions. An organism's interactions with its subjective environment are in turn understandable in terms of its cognitive architecture. We propose a large-scale classification of the possible types of cognitive architectures, giving a sketch of the subjective structure that each of them superimposes on space and of the relevant consequences on locomotion. The classification comprises a main division between nonrepresentational and representational architectures and further subdivisions.
In this chapter we want to provide philosophical tools for understanding and reasoning about complex systems. Classical thinking, which is taught at most schools and universities, has several problems for coping with complexity. We review classical thinking and its drawbacks when dealing with complexity, for then presenting ways of thinking which allow the better understanding of complex systems. Examples illustrate the ideas presented. This chapter does not deal with specific tools and techniques for managing complex systems, but we try to bring forth ideas that facilitate the thinking and speaking about complex systems.
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Can an embodied approach to social cognition accommodate mindreading, our ability to attribute mental states to another person? Prima facie it might not. Mindreading has been conceived in terms of what Susan Hurley calls the classical sandwich picture of the mind. On this view, perception corresponds to input from world to mind, action to output from mind to world, and cognition as sandwiched in between. It separates perception and action, and takes cognition to be central and distinct from both. Embodied cognition rejects the classical sandwich. The mind evolved to guide action, to enhance an organism' s coping with the world. Perception and action and action are central to cognitive activity rather than peripheral. If mindreading is a central cognitive activity, isolated from sensorimotor processing, it's hard to see how it can have a place in an embodied account of social cognition. But at the same time it seems that a complete embodied social cognition should be able to accommodate mindreading, as it is an important social cognitive skill. The present dissertation investigates how this can be done. More specifically, it investigates whether the simulation theory of mindreading can be integrated with an embodied account of social cognition. The simulation theory of mindreading holds that one understands another not by applying a theory but by using one's own mental processes to generate information about the mental processes of the other. Even though its proponents appear to have subscribed to the classical sandwich, simulative mindreading could be a central component of an embodied social cognition.
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Machine generated contents note: Introduction Chapter 1: The basics of ethical decision-making Chapter 2: Hospital ethics committees and clinical ethicists Chapter 3: The settings of health care ethical dilemmas Chapter 4: Advance directives Chapter 5: Do Not Resuscitate orders and "Code Blue" Chapter 6: Non-beneficial medical interventions Chapter 7: Quality of life and treatment burdens Chapter 8: Patient privacy and confidentiality Chapter 9: Refusing medical treatment Chapter 10: Health care at the end of life Chapter 11: Transplant ethics Chapter 12: Neuroethics Chapter 13: Ethics and reproductive technology Chapter 14: Genetics and ethics Chapter 15: Pediatric ethics Chapter 16: Participating in a research study Appendix A: Resource List Appendix B: Glossary Index.
This collection serves as an introduction to the concept of subjective fact, which plays a central role in some of the author's philosophical writings. The collection contains two book chapters and a paper. The first chapter (Chapter 2 of From Brain to Cosmos) begins with an informal characterization of the concept of subjective fact. Then it fleshes out this concept with examples, gives a more precise characterization, and addresses some potential weaknesses of the concept. This chapter shows how subjective fact is related to key ideas in the philosophy of mind, such as intentionality. The second chapter (Chapter 3) is a detailed study of the concept of “instance of seeming” that was introduced in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 ends with some remarks on the modal logic of subjective facts. The paper, also by the book’s author, answers some potential questions about the ideas in the two included chapters.
Machine generated contents note: Chapter 1. Environmental Problems and Society Part I: The Material Chapter 2. Consumption and Materialism Chapter 3. Money and Machines Chapter 4. Population and Development Chapter 5. Body and Health Part II: The Ideal Chapter 6. The Ideology of Environmental Domination Chapter 7. The Ideology of Environmental Concern Chapter 8. The Human Nature of Nature Chapter 9. The Rationality of Risk Part III: The Practical Chapter 10. Mobilizing the Ecological Society Chapter 11. Governing the Ecological Society .
Embodied Cognition (EC) is a comprehensive approach to, and framework for, the study of the mind. EC treats cognition as a coordinated set of tools evolved by organisms for coping with their environments. Each of the key terms in this characterization-tool, evolved, organism, coping, and environment-has a special significance for understanding the mind that is discussed in this article.
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tephen Jay Gould's Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History , has become something of a watershed for those who study contingency and complexity, especially applied to organisms, societies, and history, and discussions of it can be found in many works. Walter Fontana and Leo Buss, for example, ask in the title of their chapter "What Would Be Conserved If 'The Tape Were Played Twice'?" This is a direct reference to Gould's suggestion in Wonderful Life that if the tape of life were rewound to the time of the organisms found in the Canadian outcrop known as the Burgess Shale, dated to about 530 million years ago, and replayed with a few contingencies tweaked here and there, humans would most likely never have evolved.
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